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Indisputably, the lives of all individuals, now and throughout
history, have not been commensurate in every respect. No individual
has the most of everything at all times - net worth, love, happiness,
security, companionship, fame, food, land, grandchildren, or whatever
else he or she values.1 Nevertheless, a utopian strain in intellectual
thought, emanating as the Enlightenment afterglow,2 continues to
place its faith in the public construction of an ersatz equality that has
never existed naturally.3 The Myth of Ownership, a recent book by
two New York University law/philosophy professors, Liam Murphy
and Thomas Nagel, is a striking exemplar of this dogged faith in the
government's ability to eradicate inequality.
I. THE AUTHORS' ARGUMENT
The authors correctly recognize that, in modern society in which
very few - if any - inhabitants could survive and flourish without
complex social and economic interactions, some regulation of those
interactions is inevitable. Of course, the degree and spheres of
regulation are the central debate of modern political and legalS4
philosophy. In addition to regulation, many commentators, including
the authors, contend that interdependence means that those who
thrive owe their well-being to the collectivity. Thus, they must submit
to the collectivity, not merely as a matter of aggregate efficiency or
I Even proponents of welfare economics recognize that welfare means more
than material well-being. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus
Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 968 (2001) ("The welfare economic conception of
individuals' well-being is a comprehensive one. It recognizes not only individuals'
levels of material comfort, but also their degree of aesthetic fulfillment, their feelings
for others, and anything else that they might value, however intangible.").
2 The actual origins of Western intellectual proclivities toward egalitarian
utopianism go back farther. See RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM 19-25
(1999); see also GILBERT CHINARD, L'AMtRIQUE ET LE RtVE EXOTIQUE 431 (1934).
3 This is true, for example, of postmodern philosophers, who otherwise wish to
dispose of the patrimony of the Enlightenment. See, e.g., Douglas Litowitz, In
Defense of Postmodernism, 4 GREEN BAG 39, 47-48 (2000) ("Postmodernism includes
the desire to question law's foundations, to imagine a better system that is less
wedded to Enlightenment conceptions of property, freedom, employment, liability,
and crime, yet without abandoning the Enlightenment commitment to justice and
equality."). See also WILLIAM A. GALSTON, JUSTICE AND THE HUMAN GOOD 15
(1980), for a critique of social justice theorists as utopians.
4 See, e.g., Friedrich Kessler, Introduction: Contract as a Principle of Order to
CONTRACTS (Friedrich Kessler et al. eds., 3d ed. 1986), reprinted in A CONTRACTS
ANTHOLOGY 32 (Peter Linzer ed., 2d ed. 1995); see also Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
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self-interest, but because they lack an individual claim to what might
appear superficially to be theirs.5  The "government, 6 is the true
owner of material wealth and may reach it for those members of the
collectivity who are the least advantaged
The principal tool for funding this redistribution, according to the
authors and their intellectual cohorts, is taxation. Two considerations
primarily determine the gross amount of taxation: (1) the cost of
"public goods",8 afforded by government directly and (2) the extent of
redistribution of private wealth from certain private wealth-holders to
others. "Experts" will make decisions regarding the optimal
allocation of the tax burden among taxpayers so, as to pay for these
"investments." 9 As Murphy and Nagel reiterate repeatedly in this
5 The actual argument that property is a social construct and, thus, is entitled to
be regulated by the state without meaningful restriction has been voiced many times
before, although not necessarily with a focus on taxation. See, e.g., KENT
GREENAWALT, DISCRIMINATION AND REVERSE DISCRIMINATION 34 (1983).
6 For further discussion of the rationalist tendency in law to regard the
"government" as a distinct being or entity, see George Fletcher, The Storrs Lectures:
Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problems of Collective Guilt, 111 YALE L.J. 1499,
1511-12 (2002).
7 No effort is made by Murphy and Nagel to define who are the least
advantaged. This would entail agreeing on a meaning for both "least" and
"advantage." See generally infra text accompanying note 63.
8 The authors fail to define the meaning of this term, although they offer some
of the usual suspects, including the arts and public television. How one defines the
term, however, reveals subjective preferences as well as one's essential political
philosophy. One author has defined a "public good" as "one that must be supplied
jointly and from the enjoyment of which it is impossible or impractical to exclude
people." John 0. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville's America: The Rehnquist Court's
Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485, 510 n.110 (2002) (citing
DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 11 (1989)); see also RUSSELL HARDIN,
COLLECTIVE ACTION 17 (1982); ELINOR OSTROM ET AL., RULES, GAMES AND
COMMON-POOL RESOURCES 7 (1994); Joseph Raz, Right-Based Moralities, in
THEORIES OF RIGHTS 182, 187 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984) (referencing only
nonexcludability).
9 However, unlike Weberian "experts," faithful to rules and rationality, these
"experts" will take into account "the social morality of rulemaking." Jerry L.
Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons are Put in a Jar: Reason and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 33 (2001). For an endorsement of this
approach, see generally Mashaw, supra. For the Weberian viewpoint and that of its
adherents, see MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE
SOCIOLOGY 217-26, 956-1003 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1968). See also
JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 23-24 (1938); Max Weber,
Bureaucracy, in CLASSICS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 23 (Jay M. Shafritz & Albert
C. Hyde eds., 1978); Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
711, 720 (2001); David B. Spence, A Public Choice Progressivism, Continued, 87HeinOnline  -- 22 Va. Tax Rev. 557 2002-2003
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relatively brief work, government can only achieve its essential goals -
to provide a decent standard of living for the least advantaged and to
undo random inequality - by delivering a deathblow to the
"libertarian principle" of private ownership that pervades society.
Leading tax scholars have accepted, without careful or critical
analysis, the premise that the government has relatively unrestrained
authority to allocate unequal tax burdens.' The focus of such scholars
has been how to produce the most efficient and equitable system for
raising revenue." Typical concerns are horizontal 12 and vertical
equity, 3 as well as related matters of inefficient burdens on income
earned from capital and distinctions in the taxation of "debt" and
",equity.,1 4
Missing from the existing tax scholarship is sustained
consideration and debate regarding original entitlement,
redistribution, and their moral and philosophical underpinnings. In
The Myth of Ownership, Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel address
these all-important matters. 5 While not the first to do so, their book
CORNELL L. REV. 397, 405 (2002); Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2
POL. SCI. Q. 197, 210 (1887). See generally SAMUEL HABER, EFFICIENCY AND UPLIFT:
SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 1890-1920 (1964).
'0 See, e.g., William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal
Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1165 (1974) ("The primary, intended, real effect
of any general revenue-raising tax is to curtail some part of the private consumption
of economic resources that would otherwise occur, in order to free those resources for
public use, including redistribution to the poor.").
"Id.; see also PHILIP D. OLIVER & FRED W. PEEL, JR., TAX POLICY 1-3 (1996);
Jeffrey A. Maine, Linking Limited Liability and Entity Taxation: A Critique of the
ALl Reporters' Study on the Taxation of Private Business Enterprises, 62 U. PITTr. L.
REV. 223, 240 n.87 (2000).
12 See generally Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a
Principle, 42 NAT'L TAX J. 139 (1989); Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, Once
More, 43 NAT'L TAX J. 113 (1990); Stephen Utz, Ability to Pay, 23 WHITTIER L. REV.
867, 921-22 (2002) (analyzing Musgrave's review of the utilitarian doctrine of ability
to pay).
13 See, e.g., William A. Klein, Income Taxation and Legal Entities, 20 UCLA L.
REV. 13, 57-61 (1972) (urging the importance of "uniformity in the tax treatment of
seemingly similar organizations"). See generally Paul R. McDaniel & James R.
Repetti, Horizontal and Vertical Equity: The Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange, 1 FLA. TAX
REV. 607 (1993); Utz, supra note 12.
14 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., An Income Tax by Any Other
Name - A Reply to Professor Strnad, 38 STAN. L. REV. 399 (1986); Jeff Strnad,
Taxation of Income from Capital: A Theoretical Reappraisal, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1023
(1985).
15 By way of contrast, another recent collection of essays, DOES ATLAS SHRUG?:
THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH (Joel B. Slemrod ed., 2000), is
[Vol. 22:555
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is extremely valuable for focusing on first principles. The Myth of
Ownership reveals taxation for what it is - a malleable instrument for
achieving political and social goals and not a science, the application
of which yields a coherent, value-neutral tax regime.
The Myth of Ownership establishes how, notwithstanding the
widespread endorsement of progressivity by many tax scholars and
policymakers, "libertarianism" infects and limits their approach to
taxation. Specifically, two views of justice associated with
libertarianism restrain the extent of acceptable redistribution. First,
the principle of desert1 6 delimits thinking about property ownership,
notably how much the government ought to be able to take from
those who have "earned" income and give to those who have not
"earned" it. 7  Second, the principle of contractarianism makes all
nonprivate transfers or exchanges of wealth highly suspect. The
market is moral, and unrestrained government intrusion into what
otherwise is the allocation of wealth via a free market, private
property, and voluntary exchange system of equally situated and
rational individuals or legal persons is unacceptable.1 8 The Myth of
Ownership argues that the failure of those who believe in the justice
of governmental redistribution to take on fundamental libertarian
premises, which to date have been largely undisputed in the tax
literature, has stymied the attainment of socioeconomic equality.' 9
The authors of The Myth of Ownership show no similar
reluctance to confront libertarian premises. They argue that all
concerned with the more commonplace efficiency question generated by progressive
taxation. See also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Why Tax the Rich? Efficiency, Equity, and
Progressive Taxation, 111 YALE L.J. 1391 (2002) (reviewing DOES ATLAS SHRUG?:
THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH, supra).
16 For conflicting views on desert as a standard justifying the unequal
distribution of property, see ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 228
(1974); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 101-04 (1971); MICHAEL J. SANDEL,
LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 71-77 (2d ed. 1998).
17 Assuming desert is a valid criterion, it might well support confiscatory
inheritance taxes. On the other hand, desert could be viewed as entitling the owner to
gratuitously transfer his or her wealth. Incentive concerns might also justify
maintenance of the system of inheritance. See generally Edward J. McCaffery, The
Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283 (1994). Murphy and
Nagel are critical of the current structure of wealth transfer taxation but do not
propose its total abolition. See LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF
OWNERSHIP 142-61 (2002) [hereinafter THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP].
18 See THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP, supra note 17, at 15.
19 This conclusion seems highly dubious. For example, consider the rich, albeit
highly disputable, communitarian literature. See, e.g., SANDEL, supra note 16.
2003]
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individual wealth and income is dependent on the government and the
laws it enforces. 0 Without the government, no market or property
would exist. Acceptance of this "reality" inevitably leads away from
the standard form of tax policy question - how much income of a
particular person should be taxed, that is, a "fair share" supply side
question. Rather, it leads to a very different demand side question -
how much should be redistributed from those who have to those who
have less to achieve social and economic justice. Instead of concern
about what is a fair tax, the concern is with what is a fair distribution
of wealth in society. Since the taxpayer is not "entitled" to anything,
there are no constraints on how much the government can take. Even
persons with similar amounts of income or levels of welfare may have
to surrender different amounts in tax if doing so facilitates
.... 21
achievement of the goal - socioeconomic justice.
In summary, the authors argue: we ought to start with the goal of
socioeconomic justice and work backwards to arrive at a tax system
that can facilitate the accomplishment of that goal. We will be free to
do so only when we recognize that no individual has a moral claim to
"his or her" property, first, because it takes a collectivity to create and
preserve it. Second, since most individual attributes are random, the
desert theory simply does not afford a persuasive moral basis on
which to rest private entitlement to property. Accordingly, "the idea
of a prima facie property right in one's pretax income - an income
that could not exist without a tax-supported government - is
meaningless., 22  The authors' proposed tax regime would not be
especially sensitive to due process or other considerations of
20 This is a familiar assertion. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate
Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259, 275-76 (1983); Alvin Warren, Would a
Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081, 1091 (1980).
[The claim on an individual's output] can be justified on the theory that a
producer does not have a controlling moral claim over the product of his
capital and labor, given the fortuity in income distribution and the
dependence of producers on consumers and other producers to create value
in our society - factors that create a general moral claim on all private
product on behalf of the entire society.
Id.; see also Eric Rakowski, Can Wealth Taxes Be Justified?, 53 TAx L. REV. 263, 362
(2000).
21 See THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP, supra note 17, at 38 ("Tax justice must be part
of an overall theory of social justice and of the legitimate aims of government. Since
that is so, there can be no blanket rule that persons with the same pretax income or
level of welfare must pay the same tax.").
22 Id. at 36.
[Vol. 22:555
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procedural fairness. Indeed, certain constitutional obstacles to the
proposal would exist.23 Nevertheless, the authors' purpose is to
present the ideal and not, as they readily acknowledge, the attainable
24
or constitutionally permissible.
II. THE ARGUMENT CRITIQUED
Murphy and Nagel simply do not present a logically compelling
case in support of their proposal for socioeconomic justice through the
elimination of private property and its redistribution as necessary to
the least advantaged. One considerable flaw is the failure to justify
the claim of the collectivity to all wealth in a convincing fashion.
Moreover, the authors' argument that the randomness of existence
deprives individuals of a transcendent entitlement to private property
is unpersuasive. The entitlement of the ill-defined class, the "least
advantaged," similarly remains unexplored. Aside from these central
shortcomings, the authors never delineate the exact meaning of
socioeconomic justice. To the extent this concept can be given
meaning, there is still the unexplored question of why it should be
favored over other possible social or economic values, theories of
justice, or for that matter, other metrics of and modalities for
achieving socioeconomic justice. Finally, inasmuch as the theory
presented is consequential, rather than ontological or deontological,
the accomplishment of the ends ought to be attainable. These
advocates, however, neither explain in precise terms their plan of
action nor proffer evidence of the likelihood of success.
21
The remainder of this essay evaluates each of the flaws raised
above in greater detail. As the discussion establishes, the authors
have simply not made their case. Their singular and exceptional
23 The authors are typical of those who, as James Buchanan has noted, "have
been unwilling to accept the final distributional results largely because they remain
unwilling to restrict their domain of evaluation to postconstitutional contract." 7
JAMES M. BUCHANAN, The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan, in THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES M. BUCHANAN 1, 68 (2000).
24 See, e.g., THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP, supra note 17, at 182-84 (expressing
doubts as to the political feasibility of a proposed direct income subsidy). As for any
constitutional constraints, the authors ignore them completely.
25 By way of contrast, they devote a great deal of the book to the delineation of
existing tax laws and propose specific changes. This seems an odd concern, since they
also argue that consistency in tax policy is not required, as long as the desired
outcome of socioeconomic justice is achieved. Thus, the focus might have been better
placed on the design of programs to achieve the stated goal rather than why existing
tax policies do not fit their conception of socioeconomic justice.
2003]
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contribution is to reveal tax policy for what it is - a byproduct of the
prevalent political philosophy and governing structure. Nevertheless,
beyond this barely acknowledged but important revelation, they offer
little else that is novel or persuasive. In particular, they fail to
establish that their own professed philosophy of socioeconomic justice
should receive regard over other contending belief systems.
A. The Overarching Claim of the Collectivity
The authors present the collectivity argument, which posits that
the government has a claim to all wealth, because individuals do not
have any a priori entitlement to private property,26 without any effort
to explore its deficiencies. The argument that the production of
wealth is not an exclusively solitary endeavor and is dependent on
legal regulation and enforcement does not, however, lead inevitably
or logically to the authors' conclusion that the government has an
unrestricted entitlement to it all or at least to a very substantial part of
it.27 Nevertheless, the authors present the following flawed logic: (a)
the collectivity creates conditions, especially through law, enabling the
production and preservation of wealth; (b) the government is the
collectivity; and (c) the government, therefore, is entitled to control all
of the wealth that exists and is created.
1. There is No Single Claimant
Conceding claim (a) above, claim (b) proves quite problematic.
Note that the authors simply assume that the "government" is a
unitary entity, synonymous with the collectivity. As the next
subsection seeks to establish, this anthropomorphic persona ascribed
to the government is disputable and deserves greater attention. But
even granting this persona, the reasoning outlined above is no less
problematic because of claim (c) above. One problem with claim (c)
is that it overvalues at 100% the government's contribution to wealth
production and maintenance. Without individual contribution, there
would be nothing for law to protect. 28 Thus, the authors appear to
26 Others have previously made this argument. See, e.g., Graetz, supra note 20,
at 275-76.
27 Another author who fails to recognize this point is Anne L. Alstott, The
Uneasy Liberal Case Against Income and Wealth Transfer Taxation: A Response to
Professor McCaffery, 51 TAx L. REV. 363, 380 (1996) ("[E]conomic returns to work or
to investment often arise from morally arbitrary sources as well as from the different
choices of equally-endowed individuals.").
28 The authors refer to the individual, essentially because this is their focus;
[Vol. 22:555
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undervalue grossly individual contributions, while greatly inflating the
government's contribution. Further, the implications of the authors'
reasoning extend far beyond private property rights. If, in fact, the
government can claim 100% of all wealth because it makes private
property possible, then it can also circumscribe or deny all civil rights
that it also makes possible through the enforcement of law.
A more balanced and less dogmatic view than the authors' might
regard the government and individuals as engaged in a cooperative
venture, a partnership of individual wealth creators and governmental
enabler.29 The partnership contract that links them in a collaborative
effort arises through a negotiation, known as the political process, and
is delimited by a constitution, statute, and regulation.3U The
constituents of the collectivity adjust the agreement, like other
relational contracts, over time.31  Within this private-party/
government-collectivity framework, the market, as well as other
informal norms, prescribe the interaction among the private partners
inter se.
The partnership paradigm rejects the reductionist, zero-sum
analysis of the authors. Even if there is a net positive contribution by
the collectivity that is measurably distinct from the individual
contributions of market participants, the 'partnership account of a
particular, private participant may also be a net positive. In other
words, some partners make the collectivity better off by their efforts.
These persons actually contribute more wealth to the commonwealth
than they withdraw." Under a pure desert regime, or one that gives at
least some credit to that basis for entitlement, a net producer might
actually deserve a redistribution for the surplus social welfare
however, legally recognized associations of individuals and other private persons are
also contributors.
29 Others have suggested this partnership concept. See Avi-Yonah, supra note
15, at 1404-05. While accepting the model as the most appropriate description of the
government-individual relationship, Avi-Yonah does so grudgingly, since it limits the
government's claim. Murphy and Nagel seek to transcend the limits that models such
as the partnership one impose.
30 Certain commentators recognize this as a drawback of the partnership model
- that is, despite its seeming validity, it might not result in sufficiently harsh taxation
of the rich. See id.
31 For the classic evaluation in the context of contract law, see, e.g., Stewart
Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc.
REV. 55 (1963).
32 As Posner has stated: "Productive people put more into society than they take
out of it." Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 103, 128-29 (1979).
2003]
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produced, thereby evening out the partnership accounts. In contrast,
the partnership accounts of those who choose sloth, or for other
reasons are not satisfactory producers, might be in debt.33 Essentially,
they are net free riders, benefiting from the labor or capital of
others.34
The overvaluation the authors accord to the government's
contribution is further revealed by their unwillingness to address the
contribution of those beyond the government's sovereign jurisdiction.
That is, their focus is limited to the political collectivity, even though
social welfare is impacted upon as much or more by the global
economic "collectivity." It is not only the domestic law enforcer that
contributes to the welfare of all. In a global economy, contribution to
our national collectivity's welfare, and, thus, entitlement, does not
stop at the water's edge. The cheap foreign labor that enables even
the least advantaged in the United States to thrive on a comparative
basis ought to be taken into account. Perhaps foreign governments
that facilitate low-cost productivity have a claim to tax revenues as
well. Moreover, the truly least advantaged in these countries arguably
deserve the greatest attention if the goal is "socioeconomic justice."
Despite the sordid conditions these laborers endure for our benefit,
including that of our own least advantaged, the authors, with a single
footnote, suspend consideration of the issue for another day.35 The
authors' parochial domestic focus is difficult to square with a deep
36
commitment to socioeconomic justice.
2. The Government is Not the Collectivity
The lack of consonance between the political and economic
collectivities discussed above37 is just one instance in which the
authors mistakenly invoke a synonymity of government and
"collectivity." Any number of diverse means of defining the
33 As Posner has stated: "The lazy person substitutes leisure - which does not
produce any consumer surplus for the rest of society to enjoy - for work, which does."
Id. at 132 n.86. Of course, some persons are unable to contribute for reasons beyond
their control. Such partners may be entitled to special concessionary accounting apart
from the desert regime.
. Note that no right automatically arises out of contribution. Absent some
concept of desert, there is no obvious link between that which one contributes and
that to which one is entitled.
35 See THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP, supra note 17, at 41.
See, e.g., Hillel Steiner, Just Taxation and International Redistribution, in
GLOBAL JUSTICE: NOMOS XLI 171 (Ian Shapiro & Lea Brilmayer eds., 1999).
S37 See supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
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"collectivity" exist. Assuming, however, that we limit the discussion
to the political collectivity known as the United States, there is still
much to fault in the equation of government and collectivity. For
example, the federal structure and the political philosophy that
underpins that structure cannot sustain a characterization of the
"government" as a unitary actor, contrary to the authors' assumptions.
Competition horizontally among branches and vertically at the
federal, state, and local levels among governments, to a substantial
degree, is a historical fact, a deliberate constitutional creation devised
to assure multiple and competing "governments." These governments
have distinctive constituencies, that is, "collectivities," which compete
among themselves in many instances.
Government also may be regarded as an agent of the collectivity
or at least of certain influential segments. 38 As such, the government
has no claim as the collectivity, but only as an agent acting on its
behalf.39 Private persons agree through political processes how much
private wealth is available for redistribution. The government as
agent simply effectuates those transfers but lacks any claim beyond
compensation for costs and services provided. Government's
authority to act is derivative.
Another perspective might model the government as a self-
interested actor, a competitor with private sector participants, which
no less rapaciously seeks a share of the aggregate wealth to which it
may obtain access. Thus, the government will predictably favor those
policies, including redistribution and the demystification of private
property, that are most likely to enhance its influence and to facilitate
its own accretions. Likewise, it will favor those policies that
undermine the status of its competitors' claims.4n
Government may also be viewed as a potential adversary or
usurper of the collectivity's best interests, rather than its embodiment.
Indeed, the Bill of Rights exemplifies this conception to the extent
that it protects "inalienable" rights from government circumvention.4'
38 See, e.g., 7 BUCHANAN, supra note 23, at 88.
39 The government may act in both a protective capacity and in a productive
capacity when essential for efficiency. See id. at 121.
40 A long-term view of the negative economic consequences of too great a
resource allocation to the public sector might be expected to chasten the government.
In fact, the time horizon of those politicians - and even bureaucrats - who constitute
the government, however, argues against serious consideration of the long-term
interests of the collectivity and the government itself.
41 See William K. Frankena, Natural and Inalienable Rights, 64 PHIL. REV. 212,
229-30 (1955).
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If this depiction of the government is correct, then the authors'
proposals would facilitate the destruction, rather than enhancement,
of the collectivity's interests.
Finally, the "government" is arguably no more than an
aggregation of actors, who at various times and often in contradictory
fashion exercise authority vested indirectly in them by the collectivity.
Since individuals inside "government," as well as outside, act in self-
interest, any effort to personalize or reify government and to assert a
claim on "its" behalf is misguided and disingenuous.
Clearly, various ways to model the public-private interaction exist,
and diverse implications flow from any one model. There may be a
persuasive "story" of government that justifies support of
redistribution to society's least advantaged; however, the authors
simply fail to provide compelling argumentation in favor of their own
particular "totalitarian" construct.
The foregoing discussion assumes, as do the authors, that there is
a "collectivity" in the first place. We should not, however, too readily
accept this foundational premise. Although persons participate in a
political system and have their activities and relationships regulated
by the same laws, there may be quite varying degrees of association
and sense of connectedness. The image of an organism, each of the
parts of which are devoted to the same ends as well as means, ought
not be accepted uncritically. Uncritical reliance on terminology like
"collectivity" and "community" tends to obscure difficult issues,
including whether there is a shared understanding of "collectivity"
and "community," who are its constituents, and what obligations are
owed by the whole to the parts, the parts to the whole, and in what
manner and relative amounts.
B. The Randomness of Existence
The facile logic of the collectivity syllogism parallels the equally
flawed argumentation regarding randomness. Here, the authors
essentially argue: (a) many factors beyond an individual's control
contribute to his or her material well-being or deprivation; (b)
therefore, any claim to entitlement based on desert is unjustified; and
(c) since individual claims of entitlement are groundless, the
government/collectivity exercises ultimate dominion and may utilize
all worth for purposes of socioeconomic justice. Again, even
conceding claim (a), the authors err by regarding a certain degree of
randomness as proof that there can be no just desert claim to any
product of one's own labor or capital. Randomness, however,
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contributes in varying portions to overall outcomes of different
persons; at different times in life, the contribution - especially when
weighed with other outcome-contributing factors - may be different.
For example, sifting out ambition from endowment at any one
moment with respect to each individual and then associating it with
gains that are the product of activities over time spans and influences
of varying lengths' duration is simply beyond human calculation.
Carried to its logical conclusion, the authors' argument is self-
defeating, in addition to being quite ominous. Assuming human
beings are not accountable for their station in life, high or low, then
even the status of such human beings as "individuals" deserving our
utmost concern is doubtful.4' No effort on behalf of the least
advantaged would seem justified since the very arbitrariness of
outcomes would make the "success" of efforts by the government for
social justice uncertain of attainment at best. Indeed, destructive,
unintended consequences could result. The authors inform the reader
that existence, whether chaotic or determined, is beyond individual
control; yet, they give no explanation of why or how this "reality" will
alter as a result of government intervention. Randomness, in its
innumerable configurations, would persist, supplemented by new
government actors and regulations, which would only contribute to
arbitrary outcomes and unintended consequences.
The authors' default rule assumes pervasive arbitrariness,
commencing with endowment at birth. It is skeptical of
accomplishment and leaves open whether, even if undisputed, it
should yield deservedness. This viewpoint diminishes the individual.
It challenges the very authenticity of each person. Assuming little
potential for self-creation, the default rule not only puts the
individual's entitlement to property in doubt, but also calls into
question his or her liberty, freedom, and very existence itself. If the
43individual has no unique self-created worth, there seems to be no
42 See William K. Frankena, The Concept of Social Justice, in SOCIAL JUSTICE 1,
14 (Richard B. Brandt ed., 1962).
43 See PIPES, supra note 2, at xiii; see also 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON
101-03 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906). From the perspective of personality theory, "in
every case [of the loss of property] there remains... a sense of the shrinkage of our
personality, a partial conversion of ourselves to nothingness." 14 WILLIAM JAMES,
Psychology: Briefer Course, in THE WORKS OF WILLIAM JAMES 1, 161 (Frederick H.
Burkhardt et al. eds., 1984). This is not to deny some value to the communitarian
viewpoint that individuals are "situated" and "embedded in a history which locates
me among others, and implicates my good in the good of the communities whose
stories I share." LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 9 (Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984)
(commenting on the writings of Alasdair Maclntyre).
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persuasive basis for denying a government's claim of authority over
existence itself. After all, existence is arguably as arbitrary and
random as is material well-being.
It is historically incontestable that a society can only survive with
some difference and inequality." Role differentiation and role
stratification are both necessary in societal functioning and
• 45
evolution. The issue that remains insufficiently explored in The
Myth of Ownership is the tricky one of which inequalities (and how
much of them) are desirable, necessary, or at least tolerable, be they
46
arbitrary or earned.
The authors link randomness of attributes to what seems an iron
rule of immutability. They assume a static social structure without
advantaged persons who have overcome randomly assigned
detriments," an assumption that does not comport with empirical
481data. The authors also falsely assume that there are no
See, e.g., Wilbert E. Moore, But Some Are More Equal Than Others, 28 AM.
Soc. REV. 13, 16 (1963); Melvin Tumin, On Inequality, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 19, 19
(1963).
45 See Hugo Adam Bedau, Egalitarianism and the Idea of Equality, in
EQUALITY: NoMos IX 3, 20-21 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1967).
Sociologists would argue that it is the very basis for social evolution. See, e.g., id.; D.
G. RITCHIE, STUDIES IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ETHICS 31 (1902).
46 Even egalitarians defend inequality that ultimately fosters equality. See, e.g.,
HAROLD J. LASKI, A Plea for Equality, in THE DANGERS OF OBEDIENCE & OTHER
ESSAYS 207, 232 (1930) ("Equality does not mean that the differences of men are to
be neglected; it means only that those differences are to be selected for emphasis
which are deliberately relevant to the common good."). Of course, inequalities may
be entirely defensible as just on the basis of first principles such as desert or promise.
See MATr CAVANAGH, AGAINST EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY 24 (2002).
Many people disagree with egalitarianism only in that they think equality
isn't the only thing that is important.... My position is much stronger than
this: I argue ... that equality just isn't something we should be pursuing at
all in this area, either on its own or in combination with other values.
Id.
47 The authors also assume a static model in which those who have personal
attributes favoring acquisition have relinquished their acquisitive behavioral traits.
Nevertheless, no explanation is offered as to why, even if government programs in the
short term succeeded in the elimination of gross inequalities, they would not quickly
re-emerge. See DAVID HUME, ENQUIRIES CONCERNING THE HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 194 (L. A. Selby-
Bigge ed., 2d ed. 1902) ("Render possessions ever so equal, men's different degrees of
art, care, and industry will immediately break that equality.").
48 There is considerable dispute over how much mobility is in the society, but it
is undisputed that mobility occurs. See R. Glenn Hubbard, Measure Tax-Cut
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disadvantaged persons who find themselves in that state because they
have squandered their endowments. In the authors' universe, all
advantaged persons largely rely on inherited49 or other random
attributes, while all less-advantaged persons find themselves incapable
of overcoming the detrimental effects of congenital and/or chronic
bad fortune. This conceit, the very soul of the authors' project, may
engender sympathetic responses from certain politically or
ideologically kindred souls but can hardly withstand logical analysis or
the empirical evidence.
Curiously, the authors fail to offer an adequate explanation in
support of claim (c). That is, why does the government or the
collectivity, however conceived, have a greater entitlement, despite
randomness, than the individual does? The "government" would
seem no less subject to the workings of the same randomness that
besets the individual. Both the individual and government, in fact,
overcome the arbitrariness and chaos inherent in existence and social
organizations to produce outcomes. Neither has a prima facie
totalitarian entitlement.
C. Defining and Prioritizing Socioeconomic Justice
Having denuded the individual of any moral claim to private
"Fairness" Over a Lifetime, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2003, at A14. See generally ALBERTO
ALESINA ET AL., INEQUALITY AND HAPPINESS: ARE EUROPEANS AND AMERICANS
DIFFERENT? (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Res., Working Paper No. W8198, 2001), at
http://papers.nber.org.papers/w8198 (ascribing fewer negative effects to inequality in
the United States due to greater social mobility). With respect to one facet affecting
economic mobility - inheritance - compare William G. Gale & John Karl Scholz,
Intergenerational Transfers and the Accumulation of Wealth, 8 J. ECON. PERSP., 145,
156-57 (1994) (concluding that inheritance accounts for fifty-one percent of net worth
accumulation) with Franco Modigliani, The Role of Intergenerational Transfers and
Life Cycle Saving in the Accumulation of Wealth, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 15, 18-19 (1988)
(referring to studies indicating that inherited wealth is less than twenty percent of
individuals' total wealth).
49 The question of inherited wealth is far more troublesome than other inherited
attributes. Unlike many of these, the inheritance of wealth can be eliminated or
equalized with far less difficulty. While there may be adverse economic consequences
to its elimination (see, e.g., McCaffery, supra note 17), any believer in the free will and
autonomy of the individual, or of desert as a principle of justice, must be troubled by
the persistence of inheritance. The authors are as concerned about this as this
reviewer, but for obviously different reasons: the denial of the government's access to
this capital so as to ameliorate the gap between the rich and others, thereby yielding a
more equal wealth distribution in society. See THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP, supra note
17, at 142-61.
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property, the authors proceed to consider the "ideal" means for
raising revenue through taxation. They argue that an unwillingness to
challenge the private property dominion of progressive taxation
unnecessarily constrains proponents. Thus, the proponents have
sheepishly focused on "tax justice" rather than socioeconomic justice.
According to the authors,
[t]he real question of fairness should be about after-tax
results, not about their relation to the pretax situation. We
want to know what tax schedule will raise enough money to
pay for the costs of government and public sources while at
the same time promoting socioeconomic justice and fostering
or at least not hindering a dynamic economy. °
Deconstructed, the above passage is rampant with internal
contradictions and questionable macroeconomic assumptions. First,
we cannot know the costs of government and public sources until we
answer the question of what the goals of government ought to be.
Second, the argument that public policy must achieve socioeconomic
justice presupposes that government can effectively promote social
justice. Third, it assumes that we all agree on what socioeconomic
justice is. Fourth, the goal of attaining socioeconomic justice while
"fostering or at least not hindering a dynamic economy" presumes
that, at any level, governmental support of social justice will not
impair the goal of a dynamic economy. Fifth, the authors assume no
qualitative distinction between "fostering" and "not hindering" a
"dynamic economy," yet each could involve distinct policies and very
different degrees of intrusion in the economy. Sixth, the authors
assume, incorrectly, that reliable means exist to establish whether
governmental intrusion achieved the goal of "fostering" or "not
hindering" a "dynamic economy." In fact, there is presently no
reliable, undisputed metric for determining this.
Deconstruction of the term "socioeconomic justice" itself is also
possible. What do Murphy and Nagel mean by "socioeconomic?"51
50 THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP, supra note 17, at 164.
51 Any concept of social justice ought to be distinguished from the moral
obligation to help the needy. The latter would support a private obligation to be
charitable. Social justice, on the other hand, is concerned with the obligation of
society as a whole. Cf. D. D. RAPHAEL, CONCEPTS OF JUSTICE 236, 238 (2001)
(discussing the linkage of justice to fairness, fairness to social equality, and social
equality to higher taxes on the rich). The authors give no explanation as to whether
social justice means that the least advantaged actually have a "right" to assistance.
Any "right" would be difficult to rationalize if we assume that all individuals are
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What do they mean by "justice?" The authors never present a
compelling analytical statement of what they intend by any of these
intensely disputed terms. Further, there is no explanation why
"socioeconomic justice" should command our primary allegiance. For
example, the authors state: "Our own sympathies lie with those
conceptions of justice that require a society to aim at providing at
least a decent minimum level of welfare and access to opportunity for
everyone. ,52
This version of justice has certain echoes of John Rawls'
difference principle. The difference principle allows for differences in
wealth as long as the system does at least as well for the least
advantaged as any alternative, more equalizing system. The authors
regard this maximin principle as morally superior to utilitarian justice,
which tolerates gross inequalities among individuals as long as
aggregate welfare is maximized." The authors, like Rawls, argue that
there is a need to respond to the perceived randomness of many of the
inequalities experienced by individuals in society. A just society ought
to seek to overcome arbitrariness so that each person has an equal
chance in life.5
The authors also share Rawls' view that social justice is
redistributionist in nature, but with a subtle difference. Rawls' ideal is
a consensus of self-interested individuals expressing themselves
through the political process. The justice in Rawls' version hinges
primarily on self-interest. Murphy's and Nagel's conception of justice,
on the other hand, appears to have an external moral base. For
example, it is "bad" for an individual to live a life that is often
humiliating.5 The authors differ dramatically from Rawls in another
respect. In a very critical passage, they declare:
equals. See CAVANAGH, supra note 46, at 13 (positing that "[t]he only way of
justifying redistributive taxation would be to say, first, that we all have a positive duty
towards the poor," though the author actually supports redistributive taxation).
52 THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP, supra note 17, at 140. But cf. Kaplow & Shavell,
supra note 1. The notion of "welfare" is a much disputed concept with respect to
content, as well as measurement, and the authors do not clarify their own stance in
this debate, other than by stating they are not referring to aggregate utilitarian
welfare. Likewise, their reference to a "decent minimum level" suffers from the same
shortcomings. "[A]ccess to opportunity" is also left undefined, though we are
informed that it is more than the "specious" opportunity argued for by opponents of
aggressive forms of preferences.
53 THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP, supra note 17, at 54.
54 Id. at 54-55.
55 See infra text accompanying note 60.
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We are persuaded that a society's institutions should promote
the welfare of the worst off well beyond what most people
would count as the required minimum - at the expense, if
necessary, not only of the welfare of the best off but also of
16total welfare, the total size of the pie.
Unlike Rawls, the authors posit that the least advantaged must reach
an explicit level, a standard of living, which is "well beyond what most
people would count as the required minimum." This standard is as ill-
defined as "socioeconomic justice" and its component parts. More
significantly, the authors seem prepared to sacrifice the overall
welfare of the collectivity, even that of the less well-off, for the goal of
individual minimum welfare of the least well-off.57
The authors' response to the following question further reveals
their position. If a private property system increases the wealth of the
"least advantaged" above "poverty," and where it might otherwise be
under any other system, but palpable inequalities of wealth persist,
should the private property system nevertheless be rejected? The
authors state:
We are uncertain about this question. There is something
palpably unfair about a society in which a small minority are
vastly richer than their compatriots, or in which successive
generations are born into these positions of wealth, even if no
one in the society is very badly off in absolute terms."
This response reveals the hidden egalitarian agenda that the authors
seek to perpetuate throughout this work. It supports the conclusion
that the authors' real concern is not the achievement of a standard of
living for all that is "well beyond what most people would count as the
required minimum," but rather an "equal standard of living."
Even if a "decent standard of living," as opposed to an "equal
56 THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP, supra note 17, at 140-41.
57 This statement also seemingly contradicts an earlier statement about not
hindering the dynamic growth of the economy. See supra note 50 and accompanying
text. This assumes government intervention inevitably impacts negatively on market
efficiency. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
58 THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP, supra note 17, at 186-87. Why is it "unfair?" They
never explain. Moreover, if all persons have equal opportunity, see supra note 52 and
accompanying text, but (a) are endowed with different, unequal attributes and (b)
experience different fates along the way, then before long, wide gaps in well-being
will re-emerge, notwithstanding stringent efforts to close the gap between the least
advantaged and other members of the society.
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standard of living," is the authors' prime preoccupation, the reader
searches in vain for a compelling reason why it ought to be the
collectivity's number one priority, if not obligation. 9 The authors
offer a single passage attempting to explain their preoccupation:
Poverty is bad from all these points of view. The lives of the
poor are hard, often humiliating; children born poor have
fewer opportunities and lower expectations. However you
slice it, an increase in the resources of poor people will do a
lot of good, per dollar - more good than a comparable
increase in the resources of those who have more, or much
more. That is the most general and straightforward basis for
redistributive policies, and it holds in some degree for a wide
range of views this side of libertarianism.60
A critical reading of this rationale raises many more questions than it
answers. The authors do not address the definition of poverty, despite
the fact that the attainment of their conception of socioeconomic
61justice inevitably implicates a baseline for measuring poverty.
Further, if "poverty" is the villain, why do the authors demand a
minimum standard of living "well beyond what most people would
count as the required minimum? 6 ' They fail to explain the precise
nature of the injustice suffered by those who are above poverty but
59 See supra note 51 as to the "right" of the least advantaged to obtain
assistance.
60 THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP, supra note 17, at 135; see also Kalle Pihlainen, The
Liberalist 'Esprit analytique' as a Hindrance to Social Justice, in LIBERALISM AND
SOCIAL JUSTICE 100, 100 (Gideon Calder et al. eds., 2000); RICHARD RORTY,
CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 91-92 (1989). Pihlainen makes the point that
rights-talk keeps the focus on legislation to provide equal opportunities and on issues
of mediating conflicting claims of right. It shuts out talk of "humanness" and
empathy with other human beings. For Rorty, "humiliation" has a more general and
deeper meaning than the humiliation of the poor, which is described by Murphy and
Nagel. In the Nietzchean sense, each person is a poet who creates a "final
vocabulary" or identity for oneself. Rorty acknowledges that, according to the liberal
ironist, humiliation comes when the public sphere or other individuals create a
different identity for another using their own final vocabularies.
61 One author overcomes this seemingly insoluble definitional problem by
declaring: "Let's immediately get rid of one standard obstacle to any further such
discussion [of 'need'] by supposing that we are in possession of a canonical conception
of 'need,' along with a viable metric for identifying its unit-instances and for
aggregating their incidence in a population." Hillel Steiner, The Ethics of
Redistribution, 68 ACTA PHILOSOPHICA FENNICA 37,39 (2001).
62 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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below their minimum standard of living.
The foregoing is part and parcel of the authors' failure to flesh out
their conception of socioeconomic justice and to grapple with the
inevitable issues of implementation. Their routine practice of
interchangeably referring to the "poor" and the "least advantaged" is
typical of their analytical imprecision. 63
Likewise, the term "least advantaged" suffers from ambiguity.
"Least" can literally mean the very last person in terms of the
quantum of advantage or a subset of persons, defined by certain
parameters. "Advantage" also necessitates development as a concept.
It can be a purely gross or, alternatively, net measurement. It can be
computed on an individual or a family unit basis. It can take into
account only financial factors or take into account as well other
positive attributes and detriments.
Assuming for the moment the synonymity of "poor" and "least
advantaged," one can concede as a normative matter that there is
some low level of material existence, properly defined as "poverty,"
that "is bad," as the authors argue, and that "[t]he lives of the poor
are hard," without conceding theirs are the only "hard" lives. While
the lives of the poor are "often humiliating," others experience
humiliation or suffer "hard," desperate lives in different ways.64
Persons of all socioeconomic classes suffer from debilitating and
incurable illnesses and disabilities. Moreover, even if all current ills
could be cured, the cost might leave little for future generations. The
authors apparently either assume that socioeconomic justice at this
point in time is the sole concern, or that, once achieved, it will assure
socioeconomic justice well into the future. If the first is the case,
certain persons in being are simply being favored at the expense of
those to come. If the latter is the case, there is no proof at all offered
that socioeconomic justice will be sustainable.
The solution to any humiliations or sufferings involves real wealth
63 As noted previously, "poor" does not seem to include the "poorest," those
who barely subsist in underdeveloped countries. See supra note 35 and accompanying
text.
The authors do not make clear what they mean by humiliation and how it
would be measured. For example, a more sensitive person might more easily feel
humiliated. Should the subjective sensitivities of each poor person be taken into
account, or is some objective standard to be applied? If the latter, then whose shall it
be, the reasonable well-off person, the reasonable poor person? Would different
culturally-specific attitudes need to be taken into account? See supra note 60. They
also fail to explain why we should care about hard lives and humiliation. But see
supra note 60.
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costs. Yet, if one is to cure or significantly ameliorate all hard lives,
humiliations, sufferings, and environmental degradations now and
into the future, cost may represent an insuperable constraint. Choices
must be made. Proponents of the eradication of any particular
humiliation or suffering are likely to make a rational defense for their
concern being the principal concern of the collectivity65 to be
66
eliminated by redistribution.
In this regard, the authors of The Myth of Ownership fail to
provide an analytically satisfying argument that justifies priority being
given to socioeconomic justice, the condition that concerns them most.
Rather, they present their argument in an emotionally polemical
fashion that may appeal to sympathetic readers, but not to those who
may have a different primary concern in a world of limited resources.
Even if we are willing to grant a powerful redistributionist role for
government, Murphy and Nagel have not made the case for
"socioeconomic justice" as the principal redistributionist objective.67
The authors write in terms of "[olur own sympathies, ' 68 but the
collectivity might choose to give higher priority now or later to values
other than "socioeconomic justice" or even "justice" itself. For
instance, the collectivity might conclude that private property,
regardless of unequal distribution, is the first priority of society. It
might define socioeconomic justice as the preservation of private
property rights, or it might define justice per se in this way and assign
65 Of course, a rational approach that also comports with political imperatives
might be one that was not singular in focus but rather ameliorated a wide assortment
of concerns to differing degrees. This is what actually takes place.
66 History, including the history of moral and political thought, reveals a
wide range of redistributive views which variously endorse the attainment
of D3 (entitlement according to social status), D4 (entitlement according to
productive contribution), D5 (entitlement according to property owners'
choices), D6 (entitlement according to collective agreement), etc.
Steiner, supra note 61, at 38.
67 See MARCEL WISSENBURG, IMPERFECrION AND IMPARTIALITY 22-25 (1999).
68 THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP, supra note 17, at 140. For a similar
personalization, see, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 15, at 1412, in which Professor Avi-
Yonah, after suggesting several other bases for eliminating inequality through severe
taxation of the rich, states:
In my view, however, the best argument in favor of taxing the rich is not
that inequality may threaten growth, or even threaten revolution. Rather,
it is the argument that underlay attempts to tax the rich from the beginnings
of the American experiment: that there is something inherently
undemocratic in extreme concentrations of wealth and power.
Avi-Yonah, supra note 15, at 1412.
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"justice" a higher social value than any of the interests reflected in the
authors' use of the term "socioeconomic justice." Indeed, the authors
concede that there are many competing theories of justice. 69 The
authors fail to convince that (a) justice is the preeminent concern of a
69 Many others have recognized the inability to agree upon a single concept of
justice. See, e.g., HANS KELSEN, What Is Justice?, in WHAT IS JUSTICE?: JUSTICE, LAW,
AND POLITICS IN THE MIRROR OF SCIENCE 1, 1, 4 (1957). Kelsen states:
No other question has been discussed so passionately; no other question
has caused so much precious blood and so many bitter tears to be shed; no
other question has been the object of so much intensive thinking by the
most illustrious thinkers from Plato to Kant; and yet, this question is today
as unanswered as it ever was.
[It relates to] which human interests are worthy of being satisfied and,
especially, what is their proper order of rank? ... The problem of values is
in the first place the problem of conflicts of values, and this problem cannot
be solved by means of rational cognition. The answer to these questions is a
judgment of value, determined by emotional factors, and, therefore,
subjective in character - valid only for the judging subject, and therefore
relative only.
Id. at 1, 4; see also ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 1
(1988) ("[U]nderlying this wide diversity of judgments upon particular types of issue
are a set of conflicting conceptions of justice, conceptions which are strikingly at odds
with one another in a number of ways."). A similar point is made by Knut Wicksell:
Each attempted solution of our problem will necessarily be coloured more
or less by the general social and political philosophy of the writer, by his
station in life, and by his personal sympathies and antipathies.... Justice
from above to below always smacks of condescension or contempt. Justice
from below to above has only too often been synonymous with revenge.
Knut Wicksell, A New Principle of Just Taxation, in CLASSICS IN THE THEORY OF
PUBLIC FINANCE 72, 74 (Richard A. Musgrave & Alan T. Peacock eds., 1958). In the
same vein, Aristotle states that:
Quarrels and accusations arise, then, when those who are equal possess or
are given unequal parts or when those who are unequal possess or are given
equal parts. Again, this is clear from what happens with respect to merit.
All men agree that what is just in distribution should be according to merit
of some sort, but not all men agree as to what that merit should be; those
who advocate mob rule assert that this is freedom, oligarchs that it is
wealth, others that it is high lineage, and aristocrats that it is virtue.
THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 83 (Hippocrates G. Apostle trans., 1975). Thus, a man is
unjust when "he takes more than his share," although the question of what is his share
remains. See generally Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Tax Fairness or Unfairness? A
Consideration of the Philosophical Bases for Unequal Taxation of Individuals, 12 AM.
J. TAX POL'Y 221, 258 n.186 (1995).
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society, (b) social justice is the first order of justice, and (c) their
theory of social justice might command more of our respect than any
other, even assuming the validity of (a) and (b). 0
The authors assert: "The real issue of political morality is the
extent to which social outcomes are just ... .,,7 Even granting the
primacy of social justice, this comment tells us nothing about which
social outcomes are just. The authors' assumption that social justice
necessarily entails redistribution by the state does not necessarily
follow a commitment to "social justice."" For example, one may see
social justice more as a question of process and impartiality than of
defined outcomes.7 3 It may involve a moral quality, such as reward
based on at least an element of personal entitlement.74
Murphy and Nagel recognize that:
The question would become what values we want to uphold
and reflect in our collectively enacted system of property
rights - how much weight should be given to the alleviation of
poverty and the provision of equal chances; how much to
ensuring that people reap the rewards and penalties for their
efforts or lack thereof; how much to leaving people free of
interference in their voluntary interactions. It is not ruled out
that the preferred system would be one that denied the state
substantial responsibility for combating economic inequality;
but that position could not rely on the support of pretax
property rights.75
Assuming that we are considering a pre-Constitutional regime,
the very last clause in the quotation is correct. The quantum of a
person's right to secure private property is a political question, not
one that is objectively determined. William Galston has argued:
"Justified belief, then, is opinion that has survived the most rigorous
" Cf. WISSENBURG, supra note 67, at 4-5.
71 THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP, supra note 17, at 131.
n See, e.g., the position of the Roman Catholic Church, as set forth in Leo XIII,
Rerum Novarum, in PROCLAIMING JUSTICE AND PEACE: DOCUMENTS FROM JOHN
XXIII TO JOHN PAUL II 43-58 (Michael Walsh & Brian Davies eds., 1991). Social
justice may be one of several ways of conceptualizing the question of justice, often
phrased as giving one his or her due. See DAVID MILLER, SOCIAL JUSTICE 26 (1976).
73 See 2 BRIAN BARRY, A TREATISE ON SOCIAL JUSTICE: JUSTICE AS
IMPARTIALITY 11 (1995).
71 Cf. HENRY SIDGWICK, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 502-06
(1883).
75 THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP, supra note 17, at 177.
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process of dialectical testing in contestation with the available
contrasting views. 76  Murphy's and Nagel's lack of interest in
engaging in serious contestation over the merits of the
Constitutionally-protected private property regime versus their own
proposal 77 may reflect the conclusion that positions are already too
entrenched to make a dialogue worthwhile. Alternatively, their
objective may be to enter the stage reserved for public intellectuals to
rally the committed, to persuade those tax scholars who are "leaning"
their way and may need a not-so-subtle push. While they demonstrate
little confidence that a democratically arrived at choice wouldpresntl faor teir . . 78
presently favor their position, they may be inspired, nevertheless, by
a desire to provide a philosophical argument that offers intellectual
legitimacy for those who some day may lead the political charge
against private property in the name of "socioeconomic justice."
Meanwhile, the authors acknowledge that the current property
regime is solidly entrenched 79 and that it is very likely to persist in the
foreseeable future because of individual self-interest.8°  Their
pessimism is so great that they are prepared to consider a mere
expansion of the earned income credit as success for now,
notwithstanding their otherwise revolutionary aspirations. At times,
The Myth of Ownership seems more an auto-response to the authors'
76 WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY
IN THE LIBERAL STATE 33 (1991).
7n This work should be contrasted with their very careful, elegant argumentation
over other issues that are insoluble. See, e.g., LIAM MURPHY, MORAL DEMANDS IN
NONIDEAL THEORY (2000); THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY (1991);
THOMAS NAGEL, THE POSSIBILITY OF ALTRUISM (1970).
78 See, e.g., THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP, supra note 17, at 182 ("On the other
hand, while we are sympathetic to more robust egalitarian views that take social
responsibility substantially beyond the level of minimal decency, their political
prospects seem dim, at least in the short run."); see also id. at 176-77.
79 In part, they attribute this to a rather superficial, popular media notion of
money in politics. See id. at 187. They also acknowledge new possibilities with the
passage of campaign finance reform. See id. at 187-88. A more sophisticated
approach to the political process and taxation would concede that more and more
persons have been relieved of taxpaying obligations in an effort to buy off the
majority. Thus, the situation is one of competing currents - money from the top
counterpoised against votes from the bottom and lower-middle class. On the other
hand, the authors reveal their complete na'fvet6 in assuming that the campaign finance
legislation that has passed will have any more success in drying up money in politics
than prior "reform" legislation. The reality is that money in politics is like water - if
one path is blocked, it will find another way around.
80 See, e.g., id. at 178 ("Individuals in a capitalist economy pursue their economic
self-interest in the market, both as buyers and as sellers of labor and other goods.").
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own overwrought feelings of pessimism, based on their perception of
irremedial human proclivities toward "selfishness," than a serious
attempt to make the philosophical or moral case against private
entitlement to property and in favor of totalitarian government
control.
D. Rejection of Marxism; Echoes of National Socialism/National
Capitalism
Is the authors' prescription Marxist? The authors explicitly reject
the Marxist concept of equality as having "played itself out, at
enormous cost. '8  The authors are clearly not Marxist themselves.
For example, they do not present a historical and social account of the
condition of the least-advantaged. They also oppose ownership of the
means of production by the state. Nevertheless, they seem quite
sympathetic to Hegelian theory, as opposed to Lockean, in their
support of a minimum of property for each person to enable an
expression of freedom, but without the Lockean opposition to state
intervention."
Remarkably, key elements of the authors' conception are
strikingly similar to economic aspects of national socialism/national
capitalism of the 1930s, especially the concept of "conditional
possession, under which the state, the owner of last resort, reserved to
itself the right to interfere with and even confiscate assets which, in its
judgment, were unsatisfactorily used., 8 3 One need only consider the
following statement of the authors: "The state does not own its
citizens, nor do they own each other collectively. But individual
citizens don't own anything except through laws that are enacted and
enforced by the state.",1
4
While The Myth of Ownership does not suggest that the authors
are sympathetic to the social or racial goals commonly associated with
81 Id. at 188. In any event, Marx likely would not be sympathetic to any liberal-
style social justice theory. Other than one statement in the Critique of the Gotha
Program, there is no evidence of a liberal conception of social justice. KARL MARX,
Critique of the Gotha Program, in BASIC WRITINGS ON POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY
112, 119 (Lewis S. Feuer ed., 1959) ("From each according to his ability, to each
according to his needs!"). There could not be one in that there could be no consensus
in the context of classes in conflict with no shared values. See generally William Leon
McBride, The Concept of Justice in Marx, Engels, and Others, 85 ETHICS 204 (1975).
82 See THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP, supra note 17, at 44-45.
83 PIPES, supra note 2, at 218.
84 THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP, supra note 17, at 176.
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national socialist/national capitalist ideology,8 their views on private
property are remarkably similar. Thus, one German legal theoretician
of the period, Ernst Huber, described the relationship of state and
property as follows:
"Property is another essential stance of the national
(volkisch) regimen. For Marxist and Bolshevik doctrine
property was theft, for which reason it was to be eliminated
by the 'transfer of the means of production to society.'
German socialism, the basis of the new constitution, in
contrast to Marxist-Bolshevik theory, acknowledges property
as a necessary component of the national arrangement of the
community. But it rejects no less sharply the corrupt liberal
concept of private property.... For German socialism.., all
property is common property (Gemeingut).'86
Instead of acknowledging the totalitarian themes of their
proposal, the authors temper their underlying agenda by emphasizing
their commitment to the egalitarian social ideal in a way "not
intrinsically incompatible with capitalist economic institutions.
'8 7
They do not reveal, however, precisely how their views in favor of the
conditionality of all private property rights square with "capitalist
economic institutions, 88 the hallmark of which is genuine, stable, and
enforceable private property entitlements. The authors claim to
endorse the social democratic ideal of contemporary Europe and
suggest "there is no reason why it should not become part of the
everyday moral consensus of Western politics." 89  Yet, the social
democratic ideal of these countries starts with the same constitutional
85 In this regard, they are quite distinguishable from political philosophers like
Carl Schmitt. See generally JOHN P. MCCORMICK, CARL SCHMITr's CRITIQUE OF
LIBERALISM (1997); CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE
CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY (George Schwab trans., 1985) (1922).
86 PIPES, supra note 2, at 222 (quoting ERNST HUBER, VERFASSUNGSRECHT DES
GROSSDEUTSCHEN REICHES 372-73 (2d. ed. 1939)); see also AVRAHAM BARKAI, NAZI
ECONOMICS: IDEOLOGY, THEORY, AND POLICY 37 (Ruth Hadass-Vashitz trans., 1990).
87 THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP, supra note 17, at 188-89.
88 See id. Of course, the power to terminate private property rights does not
precisely equate with their nonrecognition. It is also true that certain restrictions are
currently experienced by private-property owners, albeit within a constitutional
framework involving procedural and political due process, in which the burden is
generally on those who seek to interfere with such rights. The authors' project will
have the effect of reversing that burden. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
89 THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP, supra note 17, at 189.
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premise as the United States - the protection of private property
rights. Indeed, budding social democratic states in eastern and
central Europe during the post-Soviet era have struggled to establish
credible private property regimes and to assure foreign capitalists and
nascent domestic enterprises that the state does not have a prior claim
on all of the aggregate wealth within its borders. 9' They have
exaggerated the space of the individual primarily as a reaction to and
bulwark against a conception of the individual as merely a component
of the collectivity.92
Of course, if all that the authors are offering is the European
social democratic ideal, they are reworking already heavily ploughed
ground. They may also be making assumptions about the success of
that model that are highly questionable. Western European wealth
production per person is only two-thirds that of the United States.93
The viability of the system in terms of the deliverability of quality of
service and its financial stability are in serious doubt. Many, including
those who have been directly responsible for their administration,
have called into question the very justice of these social welfare
90 For an analysis of the significance of property under the United States
Constitution, see, e.g., JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990). With respect to Germany, see
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 14 (F.R.G.). See also Tonya R. Draeger,
Comment, Property As a Fundamental Right in the United States and Germany: A
Comparison of Takings Jurisprudence, 14 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 363, 400 (2001)
(explaining that, although there is a social obligation associated with the fundamental
right of private property in Germany, property generally cannot be taken without due
process and just compensation). The right to private property is enshrined in France's
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789. The right to property is
set forth in article 2 of that document. See Louis Henkin, Rights: Here and There, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 1582, 1590 & n.17 (1981). Article 17 prohibits taking except for
"evident public necessity." Id. at 1590 & n.18. The Declaration was incorporated into
the Constitution of 1958, which is currently in effect. Id. at 1594.
91 See generally Lan Cao, Chinese Privatization: Between Plan and Market, 63
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 19-20 (2000) (describing the debate surrounding the
transfer of property rights in Eastern Europe and Russia).
92 In considering the deconstruction of the individual during socialism, one
commentator has emphasized individuals as autonomous beings and as property
owners. The two traits of autonomy and ownership are closely associated. See, e.g.,
Hana Havelkov6i, A Few Prefeminist Thoughts, in GENDER POLITICS AND POST-
COMMUNISM: REFLECTIONS FROM EASTERN EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
62, 66-67 (Nanette Funk & Magda Mueller eds., 1993).
93 Christian Baumgaertel, Europe's Wage Costs Lead Companies to Fire at
Home, Hire Abroad, BLOOMBERG NEWS, June 18, 2002, LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Bloomberg File ("Economic production per person in Europe is two-thirds the U.S.
level, the widest gap since the 1960s, a report by the European Commission found.").
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states.94 Recent experience in Europe suggests that the model system
has been conducive to the creation of huge gaps in economic well-
being and expansive social stratification as immigrants provide cheap
labor for the aging citizenry. 95 Social welfare policies only worked
well when these societies were homogeneous and producing sufficient
• • 96
offspring to sustain an aging population.
E. The Myth of the Government
The Myth of Ownership ought more aptly have been entitled The
Myth of Government, a comment on the authors' less-than-searching
analysis of their own professed preferences. Indeed, the book
contains rampant undefined abstractions, of which the "government"
is perhaps the most striking example. To accomplish the proposed
ends, the "government" is the supposed agent of change. The authors
place unflinching faith in the "government," despite their conclusion
that the political process, which composes the government, is
currently the captive of monied interests.9 "It" can do what its
citizens, apparently out of greed and self-interest, cannot bring
themselves to do; however, there is no evidence that the government
is distinct from these constituencies and self-interested groups or any
more capable of doing what individuals are unable themselves to do.9s
The authors literally do not devote a single sentence to explaining the
mystery of how a morally pure, distinct being capable of determining
94 See, e.g., FRANK VANDENBROUCKE, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND INDIVIDUAL ETHICS
IN AN OPEN SOCIETY vii (2001).
The experience of social democrats in the 1980s was that we had to argue
and struggle from morning to night to maintain more-or-less just
institutions, where they were in place. Admittedly, the European welfare
states are far from just societies, but the notion of a virtuous circle [a la
Rawls] of stability in societies with just formal institutions nevertheless sits
uneasily with our political experience.
Id. The author served as Minister for Social Security and Pensions in the Belgian
government. Id. at viii.
95 See, e.g., EU Launches Integration Program for Immigrants, XINHUA
GENERAL NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 10, 2002, at LEXIS, News and Business Library,
Xinhua General News Service File; Lou Marano, Talking Back to Europeans, UPI,
July 15, 2002, LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
96 Conditions in the United States have long been comparable to the emerging
situation in Europe, foreshadowing considerable conflict in Europe over spoils and no
shared conception of social justice.
97 See supra note 79.
" Cf. 2 BARRY, supra note 73, at 89.HeinOnline  -- 22 Va. Tax Rev. 582 2002-2003
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and accomplishing the objective of "socioeconomic justice" can
emerge from a democracy comprised of selfish and corrupt private
actors. 99 On the other hand, if the government is a distinct being and,
thus, not the same "it" that the aggregate of individuals is, then there
would be no shared identity justifying a claim to the collectivity's
wealth.'0
A consequentialist theory, such as the one that the authors
propose, is only valuable if the ends are achievable. Yet, a plethora of
data and theory demonstrate that "government" is not a reliable agent
of change; "government" will not accomplish "its" objectives in the
most efficient manner and may even introduce debilitating costs.''
Few observers doubt that redistribution of worth intended for the
"poor" often arrives elsewhere. If the "government" is a moral agent,
it is an inept one, serving as the catalyst for problematic inefficiencies.
The costs of governmental decisionmaking are inherent in a process
that inevitably involves the absence of unaninimity, personal loss
99 Indeed, the only hope from a nontransformational Madisonian standpoint is
to structure the institutions of government and the spheres of society to assure that
the passion generated by self-love does not become concentrated in any one fashion.
Further, by involving a greater variety of parties and interests, "you make it less
probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights
of other citizens." THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., rev. ed. 1991). The Madisonian vision accepts human beings as they are both in
and out of government. Thus, with respect to "[t]he diversity in the faculties of men,
from which the rights of property originate,.. . [t]he protection of these faculties is
the first object of government." Id. at 46; see also J. JUDD OWEN, RELIGION AND THE
DEMISE OF LIBERAL RATIONALISM 123-24 (2001).
'00 Even if the government and the collectivity are synonymous, the totalitarian
claim of the government still lacks a solid foundation since it ignores the individual's
distinct contribution. See, e.g., supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text for an
alternative view of the government and the individual in partnership.
101 For an example, see the examination of the comparative efficiency of
government and private responsible parties in Superfund cleanups in Katherine N.
Probst, Evaluating the Impact of Alternative Superfund Financing Schemes, in
ANALYZING SUPERFUND: ECONOMICS, SCIENCE, AND LAW 145, 157 (Richard L.
Revesz & Richard B. Stewart eds., 1995). Such inefficiencies have long been
recognized in the economics literature. See, e.g., W. Mark Crain & Lisa K. Oakley,
The Politics of Infrastructure, 38 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1995). The consensus regarding
inefficiency of government led to the creation of Vice President Al Gore's
Reinventing Government Program. See generally AL GORE, CREATING A
GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BETTER & COSTS LESS (1993). Gore's program has been
criticized on somewhat similar grounds. See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, Reinventing
the Government Corporation, 1995 U. ILL. L. R. 543, 546-48 (1995); Ronald C. Moe,
The "Reinventing Government" Exercise: Misinterpreting the Problem, Misjudging the
Consequences, 54 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 111 (1994).HeinOnline  -- 22 Va. Tax Rev. 583 2002-2003
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functions, inefficiencies of bureaucratic or "expert" decisionmaking,
agency costs, and logrolling.
1 2
The authors naively cite as one of their primary goals the need for
enhancement of "public education" to help eliminate systemic
inequalities among children and the subsequent descendants of the
least advantaged. They never mention the furious public debate over
the alleged widespread failure of public education even as the system
receives more funds.'03  They seem startlingly unaware of the
controversies swirling around public education, as if trapped in a
1960s "Great Society,"' 4 "War on Poverty"'0 5 time warp. Indeed,
there is absolutely no critical inquiry into the institutional structure,
bureaucratic tendencies, political inputs, or modalities relevant to the
distribution of this public good by the government. For example, the
authors state in a single sentence that "providing adequate public
education for all" could reduce unequal advantages among children in
terms of familial involvement and genetic inheritances.1'6 They do not
consider the possibility that, because of a variety of complex factors,
the goal they proclaim is, in fact, unattainable.0 7
Although the authors regard the government as a reliable moral
agent, they do recognize that government programs do not create the
sense of self and opportunity that free choice does. Accordingly, they
recommend the use of the tax system to raise revenue for direct cash
payments to the least advantaged.'l " This aid could be in the form of
102 See, e.g., 7 BUCHANAN, supra note 23, at 128-31, 186-204.
103 There are various explanations for the pervasive diversion of funds in public
programs funded with tax dollars. See, e.g., id. at 201-04.
'04 The Welfare State came into full blossom in the United States during the
presidency of Lyndon Johnson, although the notion of de facto equality is traceable to
Franklin Roosevelt. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Imitations of Libertarian Thought,
15 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 412, 420 (1998). President Johnson stated: "[F]reedom is not
enough.... We seek not just freedom but opportunity... not just equality as a right
and a theory but equality as a fact and as a result." HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 174 (1990).
105 Despite the expenditure by all levels of government of more than $5 trillion to
eradicate poverty since the commencement of "The War on Poverty" in 1965, the
poverty rate is actually higher today. See, e.g., MICHAEL TANNER, THE END OF
WELFARE: FIGHTING POVERTY IN THE CIVIL SOCIETY 70 (1996). While the metrics
can be disputed and may have even changed over time, the vast expenditure of funds
cannot be disputed, nor can the persistence of some degree of poverty. The authors
fail to explain how their governmental redistributions would be designed so as to be
more effective.
106 See generally THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP, supra note 17, at 158-59.
107 See supra text accompanying notes 101-03.
108 See THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP, supra note 17, at 182-83.
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direct government subsidies or indirect ones through negative income
taxes along the lines of the earned income credit.'°9
The authors show little concern that either the recipients' own
randomly-assigned or acquired attributes or external, arbitrary
influences may undermine their emergence from poverty. This lack of
concern seems curiously at odds with their earlier preoccupation with
the randomness of socioeconomic attributes in the first place and their
portrayal of an arbitrary universe in The Myth of Ownership."o
Assuming the persistence of randomness, simply funneling
resources from the better off to the worse off may not achieve the
socioeconomic justice that the authors desire. The least advantaged,
being the least informed, the most easily manipulated, having the least
"success"-generating attributes, and greatest impulse to consume, will
likely do so in an inefficient and even destructive manner. Their
dependency may persist and even intensify. There is no evidence that
they will be prepared to manage their newfound wealth in a fashion
that will lead to material security or even higher self-esteem. As the
state reduces the cost to individuals of pursuing socially and
individually destructive practices, a fundamentally inescapable moral
hazard problem arises."' Meanwhile, a completely unpredictable
resource status will confront other members of society, thereby
introducing dramatically higher transaction costs and inefficiencies
that could undermine society's and each individual's wealth
maximization potential."'
109 The authors consider the earned income credit to have met with "some
success." Id. at 183. They seem oblivious to the extensive criticism of the program
and the exceptional degree of inefficiency associated with it. They also recommend
universal health insurance, again giving it a one-line treatment as a necessary part of
the "social safety net." Id. at 184. Few public policy prescriptions have received more
criticism. The experience in Canada and Europe has not been a happy one, since,
apart from inefficiencies in the delivery of services, skyrocketing costs have required
rationing, or ever increasing individual "contributions."
110 See supra Part II.B.
I The ethical dimensions of the dilemma for those favoring "maximally need-
sensitive distribution" is examined in Steiner, supra note 61, at 40.
112 See, e.g., Charles Cadwell, Forward to MANCUR OLSON, POWER AND
PROSPERITY vii, vii-viii (2000) (describing Olson's identification of the conditions for
economic success as inclusive of "secure and well-defined rights for all to private
property and impartial enforcement of contracts"); see Cao, supra note 91, at 20
(commenting on the applicability of the Coase theorem to the Eastern European and
Russian property-rights regimes). Instability and unpredictability also foster mistrust
and lack of cooperation, thereby exacerbating transaction costs through self-interest
and "antisocial" behavior. Cf. Karl Hinrichs, The Impact of German Health Insurance
Reforms on Redistribution and the Culture of Solidarity, 20 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y &
2003]
HeinOnline  -- 22 Va. Tax Rev. 585 2002-2003
586 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 22:555
The authors' linkage of material well-being and self-esteem in the
case of the least advantaged and their failure to give consideration to
this same linkage in universal terms exemplifies the inadequate nature
of their analysis. Individuals of greater material means also suffer the
loss of the esteem that the authors seem to believe is necessary to
prevail over random circumstance."' Indeed, the sensitivity to risk,
maintenance of status, and loss of esteem may be considerably more
intense among those in the higher reaches of society.
Finally, the focus of actual policy prescriptions remains unclear.
Will the poorest of the poor receive a direct subsidy first? Arguably,
the most advantaged among the least advantaged' 4 should receive less
than the least advantaged of the least advantaged. On the other hand,
if triage is a relevant consideration due to limited resources and
demands of political accountability, "' then it might be advisable to
distribute what is available to those less least advantaged rather than
to those most least advantaged, if, indeed, the former offer the
greatest promise of success. Deservedness arguably is a factor in the
calculus as well." 6 If government projects are also part of the package
in addition to direct cash subsidies, then those distributing the cash
subsidy to which each least advantaged person is entitled should
consider the differential effects of such projects on particular
members of the least advantaged class. All this would prove a far
more daunting project than the authors admit.
III. CONCLUSION
The authors of The Myth of Ownership are distinguished
philosophers. In prior works they have crafted with great delicacy,
elegance, and insight arguments in favor of beneficence and
equality."7 In those works, they have gone to great pains to confront
head-on the shortcomings of their own arguments, as well as the
appeal of contending viewpoints. The Myth of Ownership simply fails
in these respects.
As Murphy and Nagel powerfully demonstrate, many of the
L. 653, 656-57 (1995).
113 See JAMES, supra note 43, at 161.
114 This suggests the importance of criteria for defining the group.
115 See generally Mikko A. Salo, Triage in Social Policy, 68 ACTA PHILOSOPHICA
FENNICA 155, 165-67 (2001).
116 See WISSENBURG, supra note 67, at 13 (using the term "degrees of recipiency"
to describe morally relevant differences between putative recipients).
117 See supra note 77.
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dominant concerns of taxation, such as vertical and horizontal equity
and the debate over income versus consumption tax, diminish in
importance or even vanish when the focus turns to first principles.
The proposed policy solutions, which are the result of so much
intellectual effort and discourse, are in a sense beside the point. Thus,
a high level of awareness that tax policy cannot and does not advance
in a vacuum would serve tax scholars well. To the extent that The
Myth of Ownership stimulates discussion of the underlying values
taxation serves, it will prove a positive contribution, notwithstanding
the authors' unfortunate failure to make the case for their own first
principles.
The authors are unreconstructed radical egalitarian utopians no
matter how many times they deny it. Yes, they really do want to "do
good." Aware of the abiding self-interest of individuals, they
introduce the reader to a secular savior, an altruistic "government"
above the fray, one that can salvage the unfortunate victims of the
necessary but harsh marketplace. Although experience has
discredited this vision time and again, these authors, being true
believers, resurrect it one more time. Uncritically, they present yet
another version of the utopian's undaunted faith in the attainment of
collective good through massive state interventionism, social
engineering, and pervasive oversight - what may be best described as
the Myth of Government. A sophisticated inquiry into the
relationship between private property and public good, constitutional
constraints and political ends, and individual authenticity and
collective regulation, would have been a more challenging book to
write, but it would have constituted a more valuable and lasting
contribution to political philosophy, the debate over redistribution,
and the role that taxation should play.
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